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Abstract
By means of an example of a superadditive 0-normalized game, we show that the
maximum payoﬀ to a dummy in the bargaining set may decrease when the marginal
contribution of the dummy to the grand coalition becomes positive.
We consider the weighted majority game (N,v0) which has the tuple (3;1,1,1,1,1,0) as
a representation (see (3)). The maximum payoﬀ to the dummy (the last player) in the
bargaining set of (N,v0) is shown to be 2/7 (see Remark 2). If we now increase v0(N) by
δ, 0 < δ < 2/3, then the maximum payoﬀ to the last player in the new game, in which
this player is no longer a dummy and contributes δ to N, is smaller than 2/7 and strictly
decreasing in δ (see Lemma 3).
We recall some deﬁnitions and introduce relevant notations. A (cooperative TU) game is a
pair (N,v) such that ∅ 6= N is ﬁnite and v : 2N → R, v(∅) = 0. For any game (N,v) let
I(N,v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N}
denote the set of imputations. (We use x(S) =
P
i∈S xi for every S ⊆ N.) Let (N,v) be a
game, x ∈ I(N,v), and k,l ∈ N, k 6= l. Let
Tkl = {S ⊆ N \ {l} | k ∈ S}.
An objection of k against l at x is a pair (P,y) satisfying
P ∈ Tkl, y(P) = v(P), and yi > xi for all i ∈ P. (1)
We say that k can object against l via P, if there exists y such that (P,y) is an objection of
k against l. Hence k can object against l via P, if and only if P ∈ Tkl and e(P,x,v) > 0,
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objection (P,y) of k against l is a pair (Q,z) satisfying
Q ∈ Tlk, z(Q) = v(Q), zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ Q ∩ P and zj ≥ xj for all j ∈ Q \ P. (2)
Aumann and Maschler (1964) introduced the concepts of objections and counter objections.
An imputation x ∈ I(N,v) is stable if for every objection at x there exists a counter objec-
tion. The bargaining set M(N,v) is deﬁned by M(N,v) = {x ∈ I(N,v) | x is stable}. The
bargaining set was introduced by Davis and Maschler (1967).
Player i ∈ N is a dummy of (N,v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}. The
game (N,v) is superadditive if v(S) + v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T) for all S ⊆ N and T ⊆ N \ S.
Remark 1. Let (N,v) be a game. We recall that the core of (N,v) is the set C(N,v) =
{x ∈ I(N,v) | e(S,x,v) ≤ 0 for all S ⊆ N}. Also we remark (see [2]) that C(N,v) ⊆
M(N,v).
In the sequel let N = {1,...,6} and (N,v0) be the weighted majority game mentioned above.





0 , if |S \ {6}| ≤ 2
1 , if |S \ {6}| ≥ 3
(3)
Then (N,v0) is a superadditive game and player 6 is a dummy. Also, for every δ ∈ R,δ > 0,
let (N,vδ) be the game which diﬀers from (N,v0) only inasmuch as vδ(N) = 1 + δ.























for j ∈ N \ {6} and x6




Remark 2. For every δ ≥ 0, xδ ∈ M(N,vδ).
Proof: Clearly xδ ∈ I(N,vδ). If δ ≥ 2/3, then xδ ∈ C(N,vδ), thus xδ ∈ M(N,vδ) by Remark
1. Now we assume 0 ≤ δ < 2/3. Then C(N,vδ) = ∅. Let k,l ∈ N, k 6= l, and let (P,y)
be an objection of k against l at xδ. By (1), |P \ {6}| ≥ 3. If l 6= 6 and k 6= 6, then let
Q = (P \ {k})∪ {l}. If k = 6, then there exists i ∈ P and let Q = (P \ {k,i})∪ {l}. If l = 6,
then select i ∈ P \ {k} satisfying yi ≥ yj for all j ∈ P \ {k} and let Q = N \ {k,i}. Also, let
z ∈ RQ be given by
zj =

   
   
yj , if j ∈ Q ∩ P
v(Q) − y(P ∩ Q) − xδ(Q \ (P ∪ {l})) , if j = l
x
j
δ , if j ∈ Q \ (P ∪ {l}).
(6)
Then (Q,z) is a counter objection to (P,y). q.e.d.
2Lemma 3. Let δ ∈ R+. If x ∈ M(N,vδ), then x6 ≤ x6
δ.
Proof: Let x ∈ I(N,vδ) satisfy x6 > x6
δ. It remains to show that x / ∈ M(N,vδ). Without
loss of generality we may assume
x1 ≤ ··· ≤ x5. (7)
In what follows we shall construct a justiﬁed objection of 1 against 6 via the coalition P =
{1,2,3}. We distinguish two cases:
(1) δ ≥ 2/3: Then 1 can object against 6 via P by (7) and the assumption that x6 >
x6
δ. Also, {2,3,4,6}, {2,3,5,6}, and {2,4,5,6} are the only coalitions in T61 which
might have a nonnegative excess at x. Now, player 2 is a member of all of them and
e(P,x,vδ) > e(Q,x,vδ) for all Q ∈ T61, thus there exists y ∈ RP such that y(P) = v(P),
yi > xi for all i ∈ P, and y2 − x2 > e(Q,x,vδ) for all Q ∈ T61. We conclude that (P,y)
is a justiﬁed objection of 1 against 6 at xδ.
(2) 0 ≤ δ < 2/3: Again, 1 can object against 6 via P, because x6 > x6
δ. Let Q{i},i = 2,3,
and Q{2,3} be the members of T61 deﬁned by
Q{i} = {i,4,5,6}, i = 2,3, and Q{2,3} = {2,3,4,6}.
Then
Q ∈ T61, e(Q,x,vδ) ≥ 0 ⇒ u(Q) = 1, (8)
because x ≥ 0 and x6 > 0. Also, we have
Q ∈ T61, u(Q) = 1 ⇒ e(Q,x,vδ) ≤ e(QQ∩{2,3},x,vδ). (9)
Indeed, every Q ∈ T61 satisfying u(Q) = 1, intersects {2,3}, hence QQ∩{2,3} is deﬁned.
The inequality follows from (7). Also, x ≥ 0, x6 > 0, (7) - (9) imply that
e(P,x,vδ) > (e(Q,x,vδ))+ for all Q ∈ T61. (10)
We claim that
e(P,x,vδ) > (e(Q{2},x,vδ))+ + (e(Q{3},x,vδ))+. (11)
By (10) it suﬃces to show that
e(P,x,vδ) > e(Q{2},x,vδ) + e(Q{3},x,vδ), (12)
which is equivalent to
1 − x(P) > 1 − x(Q{2}) + 1 − x(Q{3})
and, thus, to −1 − x1 + 2x({4,5,6}) > 0. By the observation that
−1 − x1 + 2x({4,5,6}) = −1 + x(N) − 2x1 − x({2,3}) + x({4,5,6}) ≥ δ + x6 − 2x1
it suﬃces to show that δ + x6 − 2x1 > 0. By (7), 5x1 + x6 ≤ 1 + δ, thus
δ + x6 − 2x1 ≥
3δ + 7x6 − 2
5
> 0.
3The last inequality is implied by the assumption that x6 > x6
δ = 2/7 − (3/7)δ.
Now the proof can be ﬁnished. By (10) and (11) there exists t ∈ RP satisfying
t(P) = e(P,x,vδ), t({2,3}) > e(Q{2,3},x,vδ),
ti > (e(Q{i},x,vδ))+,i ∈ {2,3}, and t1 > 0.
(13)
Let y = xP + t. By (13), (P,y) is a justiﬁed objection of 1 against 6 at x. q.e.d.
Remark 4. The reactive bargaining set and the semi-reactive bargaining set, two vari-
ants of the bargaining set recently introduced by Granot and Maschler (1997) and Sudh¨ olter
and Potters (2001), do not show the dummy paradox. Indeed, in [4] it is shown, that both
solutions, when restricted to superadditive games, satisfy the dummy property (that is, each
member of the solution assigns v({i}) to a dummy i).
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